Thursday
Jun182009
No Constitutional Right to DNA Evidence, Supreme Court Rules
A convicted defendant has no constitutional right to access the state's DNA evidence, a divided Supreme Court ruled today.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that legislatures have the right to establish rules regarding access to DNA evidence, and indeed 46 states and the federal government have already done so. A balance must be sought between the value of DNA testing and the need for conditions on access, and such questions are best handled by the legislature, the Court held.
"There is no reason to suppose that federal courts' answers to those questions will be any better than those of state courts and legislatures, and good reason to suspect the opposite," Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the majority.
The case arose from a 1993 conviction of William Osborne for kidnapping, assaulting and raping a prostitute in Anchorage, Alaska. Prosecutors had produced results from a DNA test that showed Osborne may have committed the crimes. However, under the DNA test in question, approximately 16% of black individuals would also be implicated. Osborne is black.
During the trial, Osborne's attorney declined the opportunity to perform DNA testing for tactical reasons. After being sentenced to a prison term of 26 years, Osborne sought access to the state's biological evidence in order to conduct more advanced DNA testing, at his own expense. Osborne argued that the Constitution's Due Process clause allowed him postconviction access to the evidence.
Acknowledging that DNA testing has "an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty," the Court nonetheless held that there was no such right of access in the Due Process clause. "There is no reason to constitutionalize the issue in this way," Roberts wrote.
Although Alaska is not one of the 46 states that has implemented specific procedures for access to the state's DNA evidence, Alaskan state courts are adapting existing discovery rules for that purpose, the Court said.
"We see nothing inadequate about the procedures Alaska has provided to vindicate its state right to postconviction relief in general," the Court wrote, "and nothing inadequate about how those procedures apply to those who seek access to DNA evidence."
Four justices dissented, criticizing as "arbitrary" the state's refusal to turn over its DNA evidence.
"The State of Alaska possesses physical evidence that, if tested, will conclusively establish whether [Osborne] committed rape and attempted murder. If he did, justice has been served by his conviction and sentence. If not, Osborne has needlessly spent decades behind bars while the true culprit has not been brought to justice," wrote Justice John Paul Stevens for the dissent.
"I am convinced that Osborne has a constitutional right of access to the evidence he wishes to test."
The case was District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that legislatures have the right to establish rules regarding access to DNA evidence, and indeed 46 states and the federal government have already done so. A balance must be sought between the value of DNA testing and the need for conditions on access, and such questions are best handled by the legislature, the Court held.
"There is no reason to suppose that federal courts' answers to those questions will be any better than those of state courts and legislatures, and good reason to suspect the opposite," Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the majority.
The case arose from a 1993 conviction of William Osborne for kidnapping, assaulting and raping a prostitute in Anchorage, Alaska. Prosecutors had produced results from a DNA test that showed Osborne may have committed the crimes. However, under the DNA test in question, approximately 16% of black individuals would also be implicated. Osborne is black.
During the trial, Osborne's attorney declined the opportunity to perform DNA testing for tactical reasons. After being sentenced to a prison term of 26 years, Osborne sought access to the state's biological evidence in order to conduct more advanced DNA testing, at his own expense. Osborne argued that the Constitution's Due Process clause allowed him postconviction access to the evidence.
Acknowledging that DNA testing has "an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty," the Court nonetheless held that there was no such right of access in the Due Process clause. "There is no reason to constitutionalize the issue in this way," Roberts wrote.
Although Alaska is not one of the 46 states that has implemented specific procedures for access to the state's DNA evidence, Alaskan state courts are adapting existing discovery rules for that purpose, the Court said.
"We see nothing inadequate about the procedures Alaska has provided to vindicate its state right to postconviction relief in general," the Court wrote, "and nothing inadequate about how those procedures apply to those who seek access to DNA evidence."
Four justices dissented, criticizing as "arbitrary" the state's refusal to turn over its DNA evidence.
"The State of Alaska possesses physical evidence that, if tested, will conclusively establish whether [Osborne] committed rape and attempted murder. If he did, justice has been served by his conviction and sentence. If not, Osborne has needlessly spent decades behind bars while the true culprit has not been brought to justice," wrote Justice John Paul Stevens for the dissent.
"I am convinced that Osborne has a constitutional right of access to the evidence he wishes to test."
The case was District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne.
tagged DNA evidence, Roberts, Supreme Court, alaska, legal in News/Commentary, Supreme Court
Lake-Destroying Mining Operation OK, High Court Rules
The Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had already approved the project, which was being disputed by a coalition of Alaskan environmental groups. In upholding the agencies' approval, the Court upheld its familiar rule that federal agencies are entitled to deference.
The case stemmed out of a proposal by Couer Alaska to reopen the Kensington Gold Mine, near Juneau, which had been closed since 1928. Couer hoped to make the mine profitable by using a technique called "froth flotation" to pull gold-bearing minerals to the top of a tank of roiling water. Couer would then dispose of the crushed rock and water slurry in the Lower Slate Lake, three miles away in the Tongass National Forest. The slurry would almost completely fill the 23-acre lake, currently 51 feet deep at its maximum, transforming it into a 60-acre lake about one foot deep. In the process, all the fish and fauna in the lake would die.
The alternative, Coeur argued, was to place the slurry on nearby wetlands, creating a pile that would rise twice as high and cover three times the area of the Pentagon. This would permanently destroy dozens of acres of wetlands.
Couer needed federal approval before it could proceed with its plan. Two separate provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA) seemed to give authority over the discharge of slurry to both the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which has jurisdiction over the creation of wetlands, and the Environmental Protection Agency, which is responsible for monitoring levels of waste in the water.
The Army Corps approved the gold mining plan, finding it was the "least environmentally damaging" way to dispose of the slurry, and that the damage would only be temporary, since in the future the reclaimed lake will be an even better wildlife habitat. The EPA declined to veto the Corps permit.
The permit was challenged by the Southeast Alaska Conservation Council (SEACC), a coalition of 12 Alaskan environmental groups. According to SEACC, the Army Corps did not have the authority to approve the mining operation because a section of the CWA forbids even tiny solid waste discharges -- and that includes the slurry discharge, 30% of which is solid waste. The company and the federal government argued that another section of the CWA grants the Army Corps blanket authority to permit the discharge of the slurry.
In light of the ambiguities in the CWA, the Court looked to the agencies' interpretation -- and found that the agencies had resolved the problem "in a reasonable and coherent way." An internal EPA memo explained that the prohibition on solid waste discharge applies not to the initial discharge of slurry into the lake, but to any further discharge into downstream waters.
The Army Corps had the sole authority to grant the permit, the Court ruled, because the slurry would fall under the regulations for "fill material," which is solely under the jurisdiction of the Army Corps, not the EPA.
Three justices dissented, arguing that the use of waters as "settling ponds" for harmful mining waste runs "antithetical to the text, structure and purpose of the Clean Water Act."
The case was Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council (07-984/07-990).