Court Hears Arguments On Police Interrogations

In 2003, Michael Shatzer Sr. was serving a sentence at the Maryland Correctional Institution for sexually abusing a minor. When police asked him if he had ever sexually abused his son, Shatzer refused to answer and said he wanted to speak with a lawyer. In 2006, investigators returned, and Shatzer incriminated himself. In court, Shatzer’s attorney asked that the comments be stricken from the record on the grounds that police can not reopen questioning after a suspect requests counsel.

Today the Supreme Court took up the question of whether police can approach a suspect after he requests a lawyer. The 1981 Supreme Court precedent on police questioning holds that law enforcement officials are not allowed to badger a suspect into confessing by repeatedly asking if he wants to talk. The twist in the Shatzer case is that there was a two-and-a-half year delay from when police first questioned him to when he was later approached by investigators at a separate detention facility.

The bright-line rule established by the 1981 ruling is easily enforced: if there’s no lawyer, and if the suspect has not voluntarily said he wants to speak without a lawyer, and if the suspect has not been allowed to go home, the police cannot approach him to ask him about any crime. The rule is there to prevent suspects from incriminating themselves and to prevent police from badgering them into confessing.

Justice Antonin Scalia took issue with the argument made by Shatzer’s lawyer that coming back after two and a half years is “badgering,” and the lawyer seemed to admit that “badgering” isn’t the right term. Still, the lawyer argued, the police should not be allowed to approach the suspect, since any standard that allowed the police to approach after a certain amount of time would be hard to enforce. On the other hand, other justices pointed out that it would be hard for police to determine whether a suspect has ever before asked for a lawyer, even during questioning years earlier, before asking questions.

Justice Anthony Kennedy, who will likely be the swing voter in the case, seemed concerned with the police’s argument that Shatzer’s “release” back into the prison population after his interrogation in 2003 eliminates the possibility of coercion by police. Justice Kennedy suggested that the prison warden could, for example, put some pressure on the suspect by putting him in a better or worse cell to encourage him to talk to police.

The Supreme Court will release its decision on the case later this year.

Employee Bears Burden in Age Discrimination Lawsuits

An employee bringing an age-discrimination lawsuit against his employer must prove that age was the determining factor in the demotion or firing, the Supreme Court held today in a 6-3 ruling.

Plaintiff Jack Gross, 54, sued his employer, FBL Financial Group, Inc., after FBL demoted him and gave his old position to a younger employee. Gross brought his action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), which makes it unlawful for an employer to take adverse actions against an employee "because of such individual's age."

Over FBL's objections, the judge instructed the jury that if Gross proved his age played any part in the decision to demote him, the burden would shift to FBL to prove it would have demoted him regardless of his age. The jury returned a verdict for Gross, awarding him over $46,000 in lost compensation.

Today the Supreme Court vacated that verdict, finding that the judge had improperly instructed the jury.

In an ADEA disparate-treatment claim, the plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the "but-for" cause -- that is, the determining factor -- of the employer's decision.

Lower courts were inappropriately applying Title VII precedent to this ADEA action, the Court found. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. But unlike Title VII, the burden of proof in ADEA age-discrimination claims "does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision," Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for the majority.

The case was Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.

No Constitutional Right to DNA Evidence, Supreme Court Rules

A convicted defendant has no constitutional right to access the state's DNA evidence, a divided Supreme Court ruled today.

In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that legislatures have the right to establish rules regarding access to DNA evidence, and indeed 46 states and the federal government have already done so. A balance must be sought between the value of DNA testing and the need for conditions on access, and such questions are best handled by the legislature, the Court held.

"There is no reason to suppose that federal courts' answers to those questions will be any better than those of state courts and legislatures, and good reason to suspect the opposite," Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the majority.

The case arose from a 1993 conviction of William Osborne for kidnapping, assaulting and raping a prostitute in Anchorage, Alaska. Prosecutors had produced results from a DNA test that showed Osborne may have committed the crimes. However, under the DNA test in question, approximately 16% of black individuals would also be implicated. Osborne is black.

During the trial, Osborne's attorney declined the opportunity to perform DNA testing for tactical reasons. After being sentenced to a prison term of 26 years, Osborne sought access to the state's biological evidence in order to conduct more advanced DNA testing, at his own expense. Osborne argued that the Constitution's Due Process clause allowed him postconviction access to the evidence.

Acknowledging that DNA testing has "an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty," the Court nonetheless held that there was no such right of access in the Due Process clause. "There is no reason to constitutionalize the issue in this way," Roberts wrote.

Although Alaska is not one of the 46 states that has implemented specific procedures for access to the state's DNA evidence, Alaskan state courts are adapting existing discovery rules for that purpose, the Court said.

"We see nothing inadequate about the procedures Alaska has provided to vindicate its state right to postconviction relief in general," the Court wrote, "and nothing inadequate about how those procedures apply to those who seek access to DNA evidence."

Four justices dissented, criticizing as "arbitrary" the state's refusal to turn over its DNA evidence.

"The State of Alaska possesses physical evidence that, if tested, will conclusively establish whether [Osborne] committed rape and attempted murder. If he did, justice has been served by his conviction and sentence. If not, Osborne has needlessly spent decades behind bars while the true culprit has not been brought to justice," wrote Justice John Paul Stevens for the dissent.

"I am convinced that Osborne has a constitutional right of access to the evidence he wishes to test."

The case was District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne.

Supreme Court stops insider trading retrial of Enron executive

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled today that F. Scott Yeager, a former executive at Enron Broadband Services, cannot be retried for insider trading. In 2005 Yeager was acquitted of securities and wire fraud charges, but the jury deadlocked on insider trading charges. The government attempted to retry Yeager on the insider trading charges, but Yeager protested that such a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.

Since Yeager had been acquitted of the fraud charges, he argued, the jury must have found that he had not possessed insider information, and if he had not possessed insider information, it was impossible for him to have traded on the basis of such information.

Generally courts are not allowed to consider jury's motivations, but the lower courts had trouble reconciling his jury's acquittal on some charges with the deadlocking on others, since there were so many factors in common between the charges.

The Supreme Court decision, authored by Justice Stevens, said that courts can consider what a jury decided, but not what a jury failed to decide. In other words, the court must consider whether an insider trading charge would be allowed, taking into account only the earlier acquittal on fraud charges. Juries may have many reasons for deadlocking, and it is impossible to know why they did what they did.

Because the fraud charges were found by the lower court to be based on the same basis as the insider trading charges, the insider trading charges are now barred from prosecution. The Supreme Court decision did leave open a small door for a lower court to reconsider its analysis of the legal issues: if a lower court finds that it is possible to have committed insider trading and not fraud, a new trial may be possible.

The decision was 6-3. Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority on the Double Jeopardy interpretation, but wrote separately to say that the lower court must reconsider the legal analysis of the two charges.

The case was Yeager v. United States.

Sotomayor Represents Hopes And Dreams Of Hispanic Community

By Jonathan Bronstein, Talk Radio News Service

Raised by a single parent and a product of the New York public school system who eventually went on to graduate from Princeton and Yale Law School, Supreme Court nominee, Sonia Sotomayor’s story resonates with many Americans. She was able to overcome obstacles and elevate her status in society through hard work.However, Sotomayor’s nomination was important for another reason. She is the first Hispanic judge to be nominated to the nation’s highest court.

“Now to see a Latina nominated to the Supreme Court, we believe this is a great step forward for America,” said Jimmy Reina of the Hispanic Bar Association, which represents 100,000 Hispanics in the legal profession, today at a press conference praising the Sotomayor’s nomination. Reina said that having a Hispanic on the Supreme Court would bring an increased amount of “trust and confidence in the legitimacy in the United States justice system” because her nomination demonstrates to all minorities that the system is equal and fair to all.

Brent Wilkes of the League of United Latin American Citizens said that “she is an absolutely brilliant jurist who will serve the nation well, and she is the first Latino/a nominated to the Supreme Court breaking a glass ceiling that for our community has been very troublesome over many decades.”

Roel Campos, the former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman, and first Latino to hold this position, commented on the importance of having a minority in such a high position. “I was the first Hispanic Commissioner of the SEC and it makes a difference. It sends a message that America is moving forward,” said Campos.

None of the speakers believed that Sotomayor would face serious trouble that would jeopardize her confirmation because she received bi-partisan support during her previous confirmation hearings.

Wilkes gave a stern warning to any Republicans who would stand in the way of her confirmation because of “the length of time the Latino population has waited for this nomination it has been a long time, and the hopes and aspirations are all tied up in this nominee and the last thing they want to do is dash those hopes.”