Criminal Defendants Have Constitutional Right to Cross-Examine Crime Lab Technicians, Supreme Court Holds

By Matthew S. Schwartz — Talk Radio News Service

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution gives criminal defendants the right to confront witnesses against them, and that includes the technicians who analyze the evidence found at the scene, the Supreme Court ruled today in a 5-4 decision that crossed the court's ideological lines.

Until today, the Confrontation Clause only guaranteed defendants the right to face witnesses who were explicitly testifying against them; scientists and technicians who merely ran tests and prepared sworn "certificates of analysis" did not need to come to court and face the defendant in person. With today's ruling, they do.

The word "witnesses" in the Sixth Amendment means anyone who presents testimony against the defendant, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in his bench statement discussing his majority opinion, which was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Certificates of Analysis are testimonial statements against the defendant, and so the analysts must be called for cross-examination, the Court ruled.

"Confrontation is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well," Scalia wrote. "Serious deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials."

The four dissenting justices were, put bluntly, aghast at the decision today, arguing that the majority had, in one fell swoop, disregarded the accepted Confrontation Clause rules that have been in place for at least 90 years, and extend across 35 states and six federal Courts of Appeals.

"It is remarkable that the Court so confidently disregards a century of jurisprudence," wrote Justice Anthony Kennedy for the dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts Jr., Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Samuel Alito. "We learn now that we have misinterpreted the Confrontation Clause — hardly an arcane or seldom-used provision of the Constitution — for the first 218 years of its existence."

Particularly problematic, the dissenters argue, is the fact that the Court required the "analyst" to testify, but made no attempt to explain which analyst they were referring to. In the context of a standard drug test that leads to a Certificate of Analysis, there could be four different technicians that each count as the "analyst."

The ruling "has vast potential to disrupt criminal procedures that already give ample protections against the misuse of scientific evidence," Kennedy wrote, calling the Court's new reading of the Confrontation Clause "formalistic and pointless."

The case was Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.

Strip Search of Middle School Student Unconstitutional, Supreme Court Rules

By Matthew S. Schwartz — Talk Radio News Service

A 13-year-old girl's Constitutional rights were violated when school officials searched her bra and underpants for prohibited painkillers, the Supreme Court ruled today.

The Court did not go as far as banning school strip searches, but did state that officials must have a justified belief, based on suspected facts, that a strip search will reveal the hidden items.

"Nondangerous school contraband does not raise the specter of stashes in intimate places, and there is no evidence in the record of any general practice among Safford Middle School students of hiding that sort of thing in underwear," wrote Justice David Souter in the 8–1 decision. Officials need to fear danger to students, and have a specific reason to look in a student's underwear, "before a search can reasonably make the quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts."

Because there was no reason to suspect the drugs presented a danger or were hidden in her underwear, the search violated the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from "unreasonable searches."

The highly anticipated case arose out of events that occurred at the Arizona middle school in October of 2003. Then assistant-principal of the school, Kerry Wilson, called Savana Redding into his office, where he showed her four white prescription-strength ibuprofen pills, and one over-the-counter naproxen pill, all used for pain but banned under school rules. Wilson told her he had received a report that she was giving the pills to students, but Savana denied it and agreed to let Wilson search her backpack.

After finding nothing, Wilson sent Savana to the school nurse, who searched her clothes for pills. Finding none, they then asked her to remove her clothes, pull her bra out and to the side and shake it, and pull out the elastic on her underpants. No pills were found.

Savan's mother filed suit against the the school district and officials for conducting a strip search in violation of Savana's Fourth Amendment rights.

Normally, for a search to be constitutional, a police officer must have "probable cause" to conduct the search. Probable cause exists where circumstances would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been, or is, being committed," in the words of an oft-cited 1925 Supreme Court decision.

But the Court has also recognized that the Fourth Amendment must be applied differently in educational contexts, where schools are responsible for ensuring their students' safety. So in 1985, the Court required a less stringent standard — "reasonable suspicion" — and held that a student search is permissible if it is "reasonably related to the objectives of the search, and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student."

The facts in this case did not justify such an intrusive search, the Court held.

"The suspicion of Wilson's was enough to justify a search of Savana's backpack and outer clothing," Souter wrote, adding that most reasonable suspicions would support searches of a student's backpack and outer clothes.

A strip search, however, is "categorically distinct" from a backpack and clothes search, Souter wrote. "Savana's subjective expectation of privacy against such a search is inherent in her account of it as embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating. … [A]dolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure."

Lawyers for the school had argued that the search was no more intrusive than what happens in school locker rooms. But the justices wouldn't buy it.

"Changing for gym is getting ready for play; exposing for a search is responding to an accusation reserved for suspected wrongdoers and fairly understood as so degrading that a number of communities have decided that strip searches in schools are never reasonable and have banned them no matter what the facts may be," Souter wrote.

The Court also held that the school officials who conducted the search are protected from liability, because it was unclear at the time whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment.

The lone dissenter, Justice Clarence Thomas, believed the search did not violate Savana's Constitutional rights. "The majority imposes a vague and amorphous standard on school administrators," he wrote, calling the decision a "deep intrusion into the administration of public schools."

The case is Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding.

Voting Rights Act Under Serious Scrutiny By U.S. Supreme Court

By Michael Combier-Talk Radio News Service

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a 8-1 vote that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act "is a difficult constitutional question we do not answer today" but questioned whether the section is still significant in modern times.

Section 5 requires states with a history of flagrant voter disenfranchisement to seek the approval of a three-judge Federal District Court in Washington, D.C. or the Attorney General whenever they seek to alter state election procedures. Today’s decision of the court came in the case of Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Eric Holder, Jr, Attorney General, et al., in which it was argued that since the district was not a state, they should not be required to seek Federal approval.

The issues raised in this case were the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act as well as the possibility for the Austin district to opt out of Section 5’s requirements.

Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. “The historic accomplishments of the Voting Rights Act are undeniable...In part due to the success of that legislation, we are now a very different nation,” Roberts wrote.

“Things have changed in the South,” Roberts continued. “[Section 5‘s] formula is based on data that is now more than 35 years old, and there is considerable evidence that it fails to account for current political conditions...the Act’s preclearance requirements and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions.”

Another question raised concerns over the repeated authorization of Section 5, which was only intended to last five years, by Congress. It was extended for another twenty-five years in 2006.

The Court reversed the judgement of the District Court and concluded that the Voting Rights Act “permits all political subdivisions, including the district in this case, to seek relief from its preclearance requirements”. Since the utility district is entitled to apply for bailout, the Court believed there was no reason to decide the constitutional issue.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separately, saying he would have struck down Section 5 as unconstitutional.

Employee Bears Burden in Age Discrimination Lawsuits

An employee bringing an age-discrimination lawsuit against his employer must prove that age was the determining factor in the demotion or firing, the Supreme Court held today in a 6-3 ruling.

Plaintiff Jack Gross, 54, sued his employer, FBL Financial Group, Inc., after FBL demoted him and gave his old position to a younger employee. Gross brought his action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), which makes it unlawful for an employer to take adverse actions against an employee "because of such individual's age."

Over FBL's objections, the judge instructed the jury that if Gross proved his age played any part in the decision to demote him, the burden would shift to FBL to prove it would have demoted him regardless of his age. The jury returned a verdict for Gross, awarding him over $46,000 in lost compensation.

Today the Supreme Court vacated that verdict, finding that the judge had improperly instructed the jury.

In an ADEA disparate-treatment claim, the plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the "but-for" cause -- that is, the determining factor -- of the employer's decision.

Lower courts were inappropriately applying Title VII precedent to this ADEA action, the Court found. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. But unlike Title VII, the burden of proof in ADEA age-discrimination claims "does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision," Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for the majority.

The case was Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.

No Constitutional Right to DNA Evidence, Supreme Court Rules

A convicted defendant has no constitutional right to access the state's DNA evidence, a divided Supreme Court ruled today.

In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that legislatures have the right to establish rules regarding access to DNA evidence, and indeed 46 states and the federal government have already done so. A balance must be sought between the value of DNA testing and the need for conditions on access, and such questions are best handled by the legislature, the Court held.

"There is no reason to suppose that federal courts' answers to those questions will be any better than those of state courts and legislatures, and good reason to suspect the opposite," Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the majority.

The case arose from a 1993 conviction of William Osborne for kidnapping, assaulting and raping a prostitute in Anchorage, Alaska. Prosecutors had produced results from a DNA test that showed Osborne may have committed the crimes. However, under the DNA test in question, approximately 16% of black individuals would also be implicated. Osborne is black.

During the trial, Osborne's attorney declined the opportunity to perform DNA testing for tactical reasons. After being sentenced to a prison term of 26 years, Osborne sought access to the state's biological evidence in order to conduct more advanced DNA testing, at his own expense. Osborne argued that the Constitution's Due Process clause allowed him postconviction access to the evidence.

Acknowledging that DNA testing has "an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty," the Court nonetheless held that there was no such right of access in the Due Process clause. "There is no reason to constitutionalize the issue in this way," Roberts wrote.

Although Alaska is not one of the 46 states that has implemented specific procedures for access to the state's DNA evidence, Alaskan state courts are adapting existing discovery rules for that purpose, the Court said.

"We see nothing inadequate about the procedures Alaska has provided to vindicate its state right to postconviction relief in general," the Court wrote, "and nothing inadequate about how those procedures apply to those who seek access to DNA evidence."

Four justices dissented, criticizing as "arbitrary" the state's refusal to turn over its DNA evidence.

"The State of Alaska possesses physical evidence that, if tested, will conclusively establish whether [Osborne] committed rape and attempted murder. If he did, justice has been served by his conviction and sentence. If not, Osborne has needlessly spent decades behind bars while the true culprit has not been brought to justice," wrote Justice John Paul Stevens for the dissent.

"I am convinced that Osborne has a constitutional right of access to the evidence he wishes to test."

The case was District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne.