Death-row Inmate's "Mental Retardation" To Be Re-examined

The Supreme Court Monday heard arguments from an Ohio man who claims that he has already been found to be mentally retarded, a status which renders him ineligible for the death penalty. The state of Ohio is trying to reopen examination into his mental capacity so that it can carry out his death sentence.

In 1992 an Ohio jury convicted Michael Bies of beating and murder of a 10-year-old boy near Cincinnati. The jury sentenced Bies to death, even though he had an IQ of about 68. Doctors generally define mental retardation as having an IQ below 70, having significant limitations in two or more areas of adaptive behavior, and presenting evidence that the limitations became apparent before the age of 18. Bies filed several appeals to higher courts, and each found that Bies's borderline mental retardation was a mitigating factor, but aggravating factors made the death penalty still appropriate.

In 2002 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia that the 8th Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" prevented states from executing the mentally retarded.

Yesterday, Bies brought his case to the Supreme Court, arguing that because the appeals courts had earlier said he was mentally retarded, the state could not revisit that issue. Ohio wants to hold a hearing to show that he is not mentally retarded, and therefore that he is eligible for the death penalty.

Ohio's Solicitor General, Benjamin Mizer, argued that lower courts had not yet considered factors other than Bies's IQ, so a new hearing should be held to examine Bies's mental state for Atkins purposes. Further, Mizer argued that the lower courts had examined Bies's mental capacity as part of a variety of factors, so the intermediate determination that Bies is mentally retarded should not be considered binding.

Justices Souter and Ginsburg are normally the most liberal of their colleagues on the bench. Both drove home the point that only if a court's conclusion on a single point is "necessary" to its final decision can that intermediate conclusion be binding on later courts. If the court could have sentenced Bies to death without concluding he was mentally retarded, the conclusion on his mental capacity was not necessary to the final decision.

The Court will issue a ruling before its term ends in early June.

Supreme Court opinions today

Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg announced a dissent from a decision made by the Court to allow a Virginia execution to go through. The VA method of execution is similar to Kentucky lethal injection procedure at issue before the Court this term (and of which the Court eventually approved). The Supreme Court had issued an order stopping the execution last fall while it considered the pending case, and today it lifted that order. That execution is still under consideration by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the defendant can go to that court and ask them to stay the execution while it's being considered, but Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg would have preferred to leave the Supreme Court's order in place instead.

US v. Rodriquez: Rodriquez was convicted of felony possession of a firearm. Under federal law, he was eligible for a higher sentence if he had been previously convicted of a felony with a 10-year maximum sentence. He had previously been convicted of a drug crime in Washington that would normally only carry a 5-year sentence, but because it was his third conviction that maximum was extended to 10 years. (He was sentenced to 48 months.) The question for the Court was whether they should count the 5-year normal maximum or the 10-year recidivist maximum. The Supreme Court, 6-3 (Alito writing the main opinion), said the 10-year maximum is the one that counts. Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg dissented.

Kentucky v. Davis: Kentucky says you don't have to pay income tax on interest from Kentucky state-issued bonds, but you do have to pay such taxes on bonds from other states. Taxpayers claimed discrimination against interstate commerce, in violation of the "dormant Commerce Clause." 7-2, Supreme Court said the tax was fine, since the tax was not a form of economic protectionism.

US v. Williams: Williams child pornography. He gave it to some other people. He was charged and convicted of possession of child pornography, but he was also charged and convicted of a relatively recent law that criminalized pandering (either offering or asking for) of something you think is child pornography. Under this law, you can be convicted for a separate crime if the material in question actually is child pornography (as it was in Williams's case), or if it's obscene (basically something really graphic). Williams argued his offering of the child pornography was free speech, but the Supreme Court, 7-2 (with a Scalia majority (he's
usually for strong First Amendment rights) and Souter, Ginsburg dissent), said the law was ok, so Williams's conviction is upheld.

US v. Ressam: Ressam lied to customs officers while attempting to enter the US by ferry in Washington state. A search of his car found explosives that he planned to use to blow up LAX. He was charged under a law that made it a crime to lie to customs while "carr[ying] an explosive during the commission of" that felony." Even though the explosives weren't related to his lie, the Supreme Court 8-1 said it was OK to charge him under that law.