In a combined prepared statement by Lt. General Daniel J. Darnell, Major General Polly A. Peyer, and Major General Douglas L. Raaberg, they said that they have initiated multiple levels of review to ensure that they have investigated the root causes of the weapons-transfer incident of August 30, 2007. They said that the problem is "bigger than the Air Force." Through a series of mistakes, 6 nuclear warheads were lost, and no one missed the warheads for 36 hours. They were discovered when other missiles were taken from a B-52. No incident of this magnitude, they said, has ever happened.
If the warheads had jettisoned and not exploded, they said, nuclear particles could have been spread for miles. They found that the underlying root cause is the deterioration of attention in the Air Force, which has grown substantially worse since the Cold War ended. There are 122 recommendations, some of which have been implemented, but most have not been. Most of the corrective measures remain classified.
While the Command Directed Investigation showed it was the result of a few Airmen’s mistakes, it still revealed a conclusion that there is, indeed, a deterioration of accountability. Without a strong reliance on the Chain of Command, they said, we will be weaker as a nation. Because we have been at war for over 17 years, they said, the Air Force has been spread thin.
During the question and answer period, General Darnell said that the Airmen on board the plane that was transporting the nuclear weapons did not know that they had nuclear weapons aboard but there was no risk because they were following proper procedure to carry weapons, as they had other missiles aboard.
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, stated as a question that a pylon with cruise missiles that was supposed to be loaded with dummy warheads but actually had nuclear warheads on it unbeknownst to the Airmen on board the B-52 was the actual mistake made, which Darnell confirmed. Levin continued, saying that the Munitions Scheduling Officer failed to verify the contents of the pylon, the air crew was supposed to verify their payload, and that the pre-flight log did not show any checks. Darnell said that the Levin’s assessment was "pretty accurate."
When asked how many Airmen had failed to carry out their duties, Darnell said that it was 90 that were initially de-certified, but that the Investigative Officer found that 5 specific procedures were broken, there were three scheduling errors, and that about 25 people were responsible for the incident itself. 13 people received UCMJ action.
Darnell said that in any inspection, there will be areas that are isolated because a team has a "finite amount of time" to do them. He said there would be some value to limited-notice inspections, and that procedurally, inspections could "be tightened up." The Air Force is taking steps very quickly to rectify the situation. There will soon be a two-star general in charge of that operation, he said, so from the top down there are high level people in key positions to make it go as fast as possible.
Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Air Force Nuclear Security Incident
If the warheads had jettisoned and not exploded, they said, nuclear particles could have been spread for miles. They found that the underlying root cause is the deterioration of attention in the Air Force, which has grown substantially worse since the Cold War ended. There are 122 recommendations, some of which have been implemented, but most have not been. Most of the corrective measures remain classified.
While the Command Directed Investigation showed it was the result of a few Airmen’s mistakes, it still revealed a conclusion that there is, indeed, a deterioration of accountability. Without a strong reliance on the Chain of Command, they said, we will be weaker as a nation. Because we have been at war for over 17 years, they said, the Air Force has been spread thin.
During the question and answer period, General Darnell said that the Airmen on board the plane that was transporting the nuclear weapons did not know that they had nuclear weapons aboard but there was no risk because they were following proper procedure to carry weapons, as they had other missiles aboard.
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, stated as a question that a pylon with cruise missiles that was supposed to be loaded with dummy warheads but actually had nuclear warheads on it unbeknownst to the Airmen on board the B-52 was the actual mistake made, which Darnell confirmed. Levin continued, saying that the Munitions Scheduling Officer failed to verify the contents of the pylon, the air crew was supposed to verify their payload, and that the pre-flight log did not show any checks. Darnell said that the Levin’s assessment was "pretty accurate."
When asked how many Airmen had failed to carry out their duties, Darnell said that it was 90 that were initially de-certified, but that the Investigative Officer found that 5 specific procedures were broken, there were three scheduling errors, and that about 25 people were responsible for the incident itself. 13 people received UCMJ action.
Darnell said that in any inspection, there will be areas that are isolated because a team has a "finite amount of time" to do them. He said there would be some value to limited-notice inspections, and that procedurally, inspections could "be tightened up." The Air Force is taking steps very quickly to rectify the situation. There will soon be a two-star general in charge of that operation, he said, so from the top down there are high level people in key positions to make it go as fast as possible.