Special groups in Iraq are "like the mafia"

There are about fifteen to twenty key leaders of "special groups" within Iraq, Army Col. John Hort, commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division said during a live brief to the Pentagon from Iraq. It's hard to tell how many followers they have, Hort said, about two to four thousand, but it's hard to count. However, that number isn't nearly what it was before March, according to Hort.

Those "special groups" are those that are unaligned with not only the government, but also with the political movement within the country. They just create their own group sort of like the mafia, Hort said. "They're more interested in power," sometimes with religious connotations, but it's really more about power, he said.

The al-Queda threat still exists but with the help of the Sons of Iraq (directed by and reporting to the Iraqi Army), Hort said there has been significant improvement. Approximately a year ago, the attacks in Sadr City averaged about six to seven attacks a day, and now they are averaging about one a day. According to Hort, there has been "significant progress" in regards to security.

Hort said he approximates that 98% of the SOI are paid by the Iraqi Army.

Iraq: We lead from behind

“We lead from behind at this point,” said Army Col. Dominic Caraccilo, commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division during a live briefing from Iraq held in the Pentagon. The area he commands, nicknamed the “Triangle of Death,” has changed dramatically in the last year, he said. Over a year ago, he continued, there were over seventy improvised explosive devices found, and twenty-eight recorded attacks in the month of September. This year, there were only fifteen devices found, and only two attacks in the month of September. From Caraccilo’s vantage point, he said, the Iraqi Army is capable of taking the coalition’s position when they finally leave.

Of main interest is the Sons of Iraq, a short-term military strategy that employs volunteer Iraqi citizens. Although Caraccilo said he didn’t know what the monthly budget the coalition is considering for the SOI, he said “It’s a lot less than the losses that were occurring” before the SOI were established. The budget, he said, is worth it, because peace is more important than violence.

As coalition forces leave, there is always the concern that the void will be filled by violence, Caracillo said. “There is such a large footprint” of Iraqi presence, however, that “quite frankly the population has decided they’re not going to put up with it.” Even if there is a flare up of violence, he said, we haven’t abandoned the Iraqi Army. We are coaching, teaching, and mentoring them. We continue to train them, we provide coverage, and we provide clearance on the roads. In doing so, he concluded, we allow the Iraqi Army to work and sustain themselves so that they will be capable and ready to do the work alone.