Supreme Court: $2.5 billion too much for Exxon Valdez; death penalty not allowed for child rape

Exxon v. Baker (5–3 that $2.5 billion was too high a damage award): After the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Exxon paid $3 billion in cleanup fees and fines. Alaskan fishermen brought this case for compensatory damages due to their lost revenue from the damaged fishing areas. They also asked for punitive damages. The jury awarded $287 million in compensatory damages to some of the fishermen (some others had already settled their claims), and it assessed $5,000 in punitive damages against captain Hazelwood and $5 billion against Exxon (an appeals court later halved the amount awarded to Exxon, to $2.5 billion). Exxon made three arguments in this case: that it should not face punitive damages for Hazelwood's actions, that these kinds of events were regulated by the Clean Water Act and no other damages were appropriate, and that the damages award was too large. Justice Alito sat out the case, and the Justices split 4–4 on the question of whether Exxon can be fined for Hazelwood's actions, so the 9th Circuit's decision that Exxon can be held responsible stands. The Court found 8-0 that the Clean Water Act does not prohibit this kind of action. Finally, the Court found 5-3 that the damage award was excessive. Justice Souter, writing for the majority, went through a long historical analysis and found that an appropriate ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages in maritime cases is 1:1.. Justices Souter, Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas agreed on this point. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg each wrote separately to say that they thought Congress should decide the question of punitive damages in the maritime field, and until then the $2.5 billion award should be left standing. Justice Breyer wrote separately to say that he thought the excessiveness of the recklessness here was enough to justify the award.

Kennedy v. Louisiana (5–4 that death penalty is unconstitutional in cases of child rape): Kennedy raped his 8-year-old stepdaughter. He was sentenced to death. He brought suit, claiming the death penalty for child rape violated the 8th Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In announcing the opinion, Justice Kennedy said that the 8th Amendment must be interpreted “not by the standards that prevailed when the 8th Amendment was adopted” but by evolving standards of decency. Noting the Court's prior decisions of Roper v. Simmons (2005, invalidating the death penalty for minors), Atkins v. Virginia (2002, invalidating the death penalty for mentally retarded), and Coker v. Georgia (1977, invalidating the death penalty for adult rape), Justice Kennedy summarized the legal situation in the states: 6 U.S. states allow the death penalty for child rape, while 44 states and the federal government do not allow it. There has been no execution for child or adult rape since 1964. Finally, there are only 2 people on death row in the United States for crimes other than homicide (the petitioner is one of them). In comparison, there were 5,702 child rapes in 2005, almost twice as many as homicides, so that number of people would be opened to the death penalty if the law were upheld. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, voted to invalidate the law. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Coker case led states to believe laws like this would be struck down and dissuaded them from passing them, and thus their scarcity is not reflective of a real consensus of opinion. Notably, Justice Alito did not spend much time discussing whether it is proper to examine the 8th Amendment under “standards that prevailed when the 8th Amendment was adopted,” yet Justices Scalia and Thomas joined his opinion in full without writing separate opinions.

Giles v. California (6–3 out-of-court statements by a murder victim are not necessarily allowed as evidence in the murder trial): Giles shot and killed his girlfriend. At trial, he argued self defense. To rebut that claim, the prosecution sought to bring into evidence statements the girlfriend had made about prior violence against her by Giles. Giles argued that the 6th Amendment gave him a right to cross examine her, but since she couldn't be cross examined the statements couldn't be used. California said that it was Giles's fault that she was unavailable, so he had no right to complain. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, found that the 6th Amendment right to confrontation did not have an exception for cases like there; there is an exception if someone makes a witness unavailable intentionally so that the person cannot testify, but California's argument against Giles was broader than that. Justices Scalia, Roberts, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Alito joined that opinion, arguing based on historical cases that an exception to the confrontation clause does not exist. Justice Thomas wrote separately to argue that statements to a police officer (like these were) should be admissible anyway, but he joined the majority because he agreed that Giles's actions were not reasons to make the statements admissible. Justice Alito wrote separately, making an argument similar to Justice Thomas's. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote separately to say that they were not convinced by historical cases but by the need to avoid the circularity of having a court find that a defendant killed a victim in order to have evidence admitted in the defendant's murder trial; if the court finds that the defendant killed, what question is left for the jury? Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, dissented, arguing that historical cases found that an exception applies and the evidence should be admitted.

Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land (9–0 saying Indian Tribal Courts can't hear cases over non-indians selling reservation land to non-indians): The bank owned some land on an indian reservation (sale of indian land was allowed for a short time by Congress). It sold that land to a non-indian. The Longs had previously leased that land with an option to buy, and they claimed the terms offered to the new buyers were better than the ones they had gotten. They brought their claim before an indian Tribal Court. Tribal Courts generally do not have jurisdiction over non-indians, and the only exceptions are when the case involves a consensual relationship involving an indian (such as a lease or contract) and when the case deals with reservation land and would dramatically affect the tribe. In this case, Justice Roberts wrote for the Court, the Tribal Court was hearing a case about a non-indian bank selling non-indian-owned land to a non-indian, so the Tribal Court had no jurisdiction. He said the Longs are free to pursue their discrimination claims in federal court. The decision of the Court was unanimous, but 4 Justices (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, Breyer) would have let the non-indian keep the land while still allowing the Tribal Court to fine the bank $750,000 for the discrimination.

The Court announced that it will release the remaining opinions from this term tomorrow, Thursday, June 26.