Friday
Mar312006
Iraq Dispatch Number 5
Friday, March 31, 2006 at 3:00AM
By Richard F. Miller
Iraq Dispatch # 5
Forward Operating Base Khemmis, Iraq. Sgt. Tom Donovan, a stocky, jovial, thirty-something New York City cop now serving with the Army may not know it, but the future of Iraq is probably resting on his shoulders. Of course, he carries his burden with Sergeants Brad Erdmann, James Terry, Rodney Horner, and several American cops who have joined the military's efforts to build—not rebuild—this strife-torn country's police and army. Erdmann is part of a Military Transition Team [MTT] and the other sergeants belong to a Police Transition Team [PTT]. Erdmann's group is responsible for training the Iraqi Army [IA] while Donovan's team trains the Iraqi Police [IP]. While the mainstream media remains focused on the "big" stories coming out of Baghdad, the country's future is more likely to be influenced by how well these and other MTT and PTT teams perform.
That is because in true counterinsurgency (COIN in militarese) warfare, the political component may be more important than specific military operations. And few matters affect politics in Iraq as much as security—safety on the streets, in marketplaces, mosques and roadsides. There is near universal agreement that that means putting an Iraqi face on domestic security and that means training the Iraqi Army [IA] and the Iraqi Police, [IP].
A day spent on the hard, dust-swept, sun-baked earth of Camp Khemmis reveals the potential and the perils that surround the Coalition effort.
The first thing observed when Sgt. Erdmann, a lanky twenty-something with an unusually casual manner, marched his IA detachment on to the firing range for pistol practice, was that the Iraqis were accoutered better than he was. This IA detachment belonged to the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 5th Iraq Army Division, and Erdmann had been working with them for a long time. "They're my men," Erdmann said proudly. And from the way this group of Iraqis took pointers from Erdmann on shooting, stance, and deportment, the respect was mutual. Indeed, it is difficult to convey in an article but the IA had an esprit that surprised me, as I had expected to find something more rag-tag. While some media outlets spun the recent Operation Swarmer as a failure because no heavy combat resulted, the real story appeared to have been entirely missed—the IA went in with heavy numbers, kept their discipline and performed well. It may well be that the next time somebody has to play Whack-a-Mole out in Samarra it will be the IA's responsibility.
The PTT team faces a tougher but not insurmountable challenge. News reports in the states often talk about IP corruption (very real) but also about how men keep lining up to apply for positions despite the dangers. (Personal prediction: terror typically strikes the weakest links; as the IA grows in efficiency, attacks on them will back off in favor of hitting the IP. Some say it's happening already.) Applying for the job is one thing, but staying power is quite another—I was astonished to learn that of the 15 trainees who showed up today, not one has been paid by the Iraqi Government in over five months.
Today's drill was divided into a morning and afternoon session. First, the men worked on basic pistol marksmanship. A few clearly had experience with firearms; some had never fired a weapon. As one instructor explained, these were the best to train—no bad habits to unlearn.
Unlike the IA, whose crisp uniforms and practiced movement indicated substantial training, the IP trainees were the rag-tag bunch that I had expected from the IA. But during the afternoon's drill, some wheat was separated from the chaff. Simply put, as the trainees practiced with AK-47s walking and firing, and then firing behind one barricade before running to another, some men proved better at this than others. More importantly, the men in whom the PTT had invested the most time—the field trainers who would soon assume positions of authority in the IP—proved very good at handling their men and imparting pointers about life-saving as well as life-taking.
But the numbers are daunting. Sgt. Donovan told me that the Coalition estimates some 7,500 police in the Diyala provincial capital of Bouqouba, of which the PTT team has trained but 10% of approximately 750 men. As the numbers suggest that's only a down-payment. The hope is that the Iraqi IPs trained to train other Iraqi IPs will begin to increase that number exponentially.
In a recent article, World Net Daily columnist Ellen Ratner posed an honest question: Iraqis step up or America steps out. I can report that the Army is beginning that step and the cops, while behind, are catching up. The former will prove easier than the latter. As one senior commander explained to me, it's easier for one army to train another than for an army to train a police force.
But Sgt. Donovan doesn't seem too worried. "Hey, tell that guy that he's standing up too straight behind the barrier!" he shouts to one instructor. "I know he wants to stay alive."
Iraq Dispatch # 5
Forward Operating Base Khemmis, Iraq. Sgt. Tom Donovan, a stocky, jovial, thirty-something New York City cop now serving with the Army may not know it, but the future of Iraq is probably resting on his shoulders. Of course, he carries his burden with Sergeants Brad Erdmann, James Terry, Rodney Horner, and several American cops who have joined the military's efforts to build—not rebuild—this strife-torn country's police and army. Erdmann is part of a Military Transition Team [MTT] and the other sergeants belong to a Police Transition Team [PTT]. Erdmann's group is responsible for training the Iraqi Army [IA] while Donovan's team trains the Iraqi Police [IP]. While the mainstream media remains focused on the "big" stories coming out of Baghdad, the country's future is more likely to be influenced by how well these and other MTT and PTT teams perform.
That is because in true counterinsurgency (COIN in militarese) warfare, the political component may be more important than specific military operations. And few matters affect politics in Iraq as much as security—safety on the streets, in marketplaces, mosques and roadsides. There is near universal agreement that that means putting an Iraqi face on domestic security and that means training the Iraqi Army [IA] and the Iraqi Police, [IP].
A day spent on the hard, dust-swept, sun-baked earth of Camp Khemmis reveals the potential and the perils that surround the Coalition effort.
The first thing observed when Sgt. Erdmann, a lanky twenty-something with an unusually casual manner, marched his IA detachment on to the firing range for pistol practice, was that the Iraqis were accoutered better than he was. This IA detachment belonged to the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 5th Iraq Army Division, and Erdmann had been working with them for a long time. "They're my men," Erdmann said proudly. And from the way this group of Iraqis took pointers from Erdmann on shooting, stance, and deportment, the respect was mutual. Indeed, it is difficult to convey in an article but the IA had an esprit that surprised me, as I had expected to find something more rag-tag. While some media outlets spun the recent Operation Swarmer as a failure because no heavy combat resulted, the real story appeared to have been entirely missed—the IA went in with heavy numbers, kept their discipline and performed well. It may well be that the next time somebody has to play Whack-a-Mole out in Samarra it will be the IA's responsibility.
The PTT team faces a tougher but not insurmountable challenge. News reports in the states often talk about IP corruption (very real) but also about how men keep lining up to apply for positions despite the dangers. (Personal prediction: terror typically strikes the weakest links; as the IA grows in efficiency, attacks on them will back off in favor of hitting the IP. Some say it's happening already.) Applying for the job is one thing, but staying power is quite another—I was astonished to learn that of the 15 trainees who showed up today, not one has been paid by the Iraqi Government in over five months.
Today's drill was divided into a morning and afternoon session. First, the men worked on basic pistol marksmanship. A few clearly had experience with firearms; some had never fired a weapon. As one instructor explained, these were the best to train—no bad habits to unlearn.
Unlike the IA, whose crisp uniforms and practiced movement indicated substantial training, the IP trainees were the rag-tag bunch that I had expected from the IA. But during the afternoon's drill, some wheat was separated from the chaff. Simply put, as the trainees practiced with AK-47s walking and firing, and then firing behind one barricade before running to another, some men proved better at this than others. More importantly, the men in whom the PTT had invested the most time—the field trainers who would soon assume positions of authority in the IP—proved very good at handling their men and imparting pointers about life-saving as well as life-taking.
But the numbers are daunting. Sgt. Donovan told me that the Coalition estimates some 7,500 police in the Diyala provincial capital of Bouqouba, of which the PTT team has trained but 10% of approximately 750 men. As the numbers suggest that's only a down-payment. The hope is that the Iraqi IPs trained to train other Iraqi IPs will begin to increase that number exponentially.
In a recent article, World Net Daily columnist Ellen Ratner posed an honest question: Iraqis step up or America steps out. I can report that the Army is beginning that step and the cops, while behind, are catching up. The former will prove easier than the latter. As one senior commander explained to me, it's easier for one army to train another than for an army to train a police force.
But Sgt. Donovan doesn't seem too worried. "Hey, tell that guy that he's standing up too straight behind the barrier!" he shouts to one instructor. "I know he wants to stay alive."
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