“There was a logic that supported the CIA’s conclusions” on weapon stockpiles in Iraq

Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith says that he sometimes wonders why more probing questions were not asked to expose the error of assuming Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. He says that part of the answer is that the conclusion the CIA came to about stockpiles made a lot of sense under the circumstances, and that there was a powerful logic to support the conclusions. He says it was perfectly logical to assume Saddam had something to hide, since he fought the inspectors and wanted out from under the economic sanctions. (1:20)
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Rationale for war: “Saddam had a long history of supporting various terrorist groups”

Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith says that nobody in the administration believed that Iraq was responsible for the attacks of Sept. 11, and that the controversy of Iraq’s ties to al-Qaida was not an enormous influence on going to war. He says that the rationale of the war relating to terrorism had to do with Saddam’s long history of training terrorist groups in Iraq and promoting terrorism. (1:11)
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